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Abstract
This paper derives optimal remedies for patent infringement, examining damages
awards and injunctions. The fundamental optimality condition that applies to both
awards and injunctions equates the marginal static cost of intellectual property protection with the marginal “dynamic” benefit from the innovation thereby induced.
We find that the optimal damages award may be greater than (or less than) the standard “lost profits” measure, depending on the social value of the innovation. When
the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal award induces socially
efficient investment by giving the innovator the entire social value of her investment.
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Introduction

In Octane Fitness v. Icon Health,1 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a rule adopted by
the Federal Circuit restricting the conditions under which a prevailing litigant in a patent
infringement lawsuit could collect attorney’s fees from the opposing party. In essence, the
Court made it easier for a prevailing patent litigant to collect attorney’s fees. For patent
holders, the decision increases expected damages, at least for strong infringement claims.
More recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases, Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,2 and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc.,3 seeking to extend its Octane
Fitness standard to the matter of enhanced damages for willful infringement, on the ground
that the test the Federal Circuit has used to determine whether patent infringement was
willful makes it too difficult for patentees to win enhanced damages. Octane Fitness, Halo
Electronics, and Stryker generate the normative question of what prevailing plaintiffs would
receive in an optimal patent infringement damages regime. We examine this question here.
Prevailing patent infringement plaintiffs typically receive compensatory damages, described as “lost profits.”4 Specifically, the prevailing plaintiff is compensated for the profit
loss suffered as a result of the infringement. If the plaintiff is unable to prove his loss in
profits, he is at least awarded a reasonable royalty or licensing fee for the period of the
infringement. In addition, the patent statute permits courts to treble the compensatory
award in a case of willful infringement.
Compensatory damages are the norm in general tort litigation. But patent litigation is
distinguishable from tort litigation, on several grounds. In the patent context, unlike tort
litigation, the infringement not only injures the patentee but benefits society by subjecting
the patented innovation to competition. In addition, the plaintiff has invested in innovation
before the infringement occurs. Patent infringement reduces the reward to the patentee’s
investment in innovation. In tort litigation, by contrast, the injurer harms the plaintiff
without generating any payoff to society, or necessarily impacting the rewards from some
specific investment.5
1 134

S.Ct. 1749 (2014).
No. 14-1513
3 S. Ct. No. 14-1520
4 Dam (1994) notes that before the Supreme Court’s decision in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 377 US 476 (1964), prevailing infringement plaintiffs received either lost profits or
the gain to the infringer. The Court in Aro interpreted a 1946 amendment to the patent statute to limit
damages to the patentee’s losses.
5 Of course, one could argue that all injuries due to torts reduce the value of investments in health, etc.
But if torts are relatively rare occurrences unmotivated by financial gain, as seems likely, few will fear
becoming the victim of a tort on a regular basis, and even fewer will reduce their investments in health
because of such a fear.
2 S.Ct.
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We find that optimal patent damages may exceed the lost profits measure. The optimal damages rule, when the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, awards lost
profits and the expected consumer surplus from the patent net of the expected litigation
and precautionary costs borne by the infringer. Moreover, this supercompensatory award
provides an upper bound on optimal damages; optimal damages may be less than this sum
but will never be greater.
We discuss the implications of these findings for the level of damages awarded for patent
infringement. The Patent Act (Section 258) permits courts to award attorneys fees and
even supercompensatory awards (treble damages) in exceptional cases. The model here has
implications for the conditions under which courts should award attorneys’ fees or treble
damages for infringement.

2

Related Literature

This is the first paper to explore optimal damages for patent infringement,6 though it
builds on three separate strands of literature. The longest tradition is the literature on
optimal patent protection (scope and length) beginning with Nordhaus (1969), and more
recently Klemperer (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), and Gallini (1992). This literature has explored the tradeoff between optimizing innovation incentives and minimizing
the static monopolization cost of intellectual property. Our paper shows how the ideas
developed in this literature apply to the question of patent damages. Since we examine
a single instrument, the damages measure, our analysis is simpler and more focused than
the optimal protection literature. We distinguish the static scenario without investment in
innovation from the “dynamic” scenario which includes investment, and compare optimal
damage measures for the two scenarios.
The second strand is a series of papers on optimal tort damages, beginning with Polinsky
and Rubinfeld (1988). Polinsky and Rubinfeld examined the tradeoff between deterrence
and litigation costs in the design of an optimal tort damages scheme, in a model in which the
care exercised by an injurer determines the likelihood of an accident. If care is sufficiently
6 In

the academic legal literature, at least two authors, Golden (2008) and Heald (2010), have noted
the dearth of normative analysis of optimal infringement damages. Golden proposes several general norms
that should govern optimal damages. Heald argues that damages should be designed to minimize transaction costs. Ayres and Klemperer (1999), building informally on Klemperer (1990), argue that optimal
infringement damages should be constrained in order to minimize the social loss for every dollar of patentee profit. Blair and Cotter (1998) examine the economics of standard damages remedies (lost profits,
reasonable royalty, restitution) within the property rules/liability rules framework, but do not derive the
optimal award from a social welfare objective function.
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productive, they showed, it may be optimal to award supercompensatory damages; when
care is relatively unproductive it may be optimal to award subcompensatory damages.
These results were extended in Hylton (1990), which showed that the optimal award would
never exceed the level that compensates the victim for his loss and for his cost of litigation.
The finding that the optimal tort award could range from subcompensatory to a maximum
equal to the sum of compensatory damages plus the cost of litigation was later confirmed
in richer models in Hylton (2002) and Polinsky and Shavell (2013).
The torts literature is highly relevant to this setting because patent infringement is
analogous to an ordinary tort. In the tort scenario, the injurer’s level of care determines
the likelihood of an injury. In the patent infringement scenario, the infringer’s level of care
in searching previously patented inventions determines the likelihood of infringement.
The third strand of literature studies the incentive effects of damages for patent infringement. Schankerman and Scothmer (2001) examine the innovation incentive effects
of various damages measures (lost profits versus unjust enrichment) and injunctions for
patent holders who intend to license their innovations. Anton and Yao (2007) examine
competition and innovation incentives under the lost-profits measure in a duopoly model,
analyzing incentives to infringe. Our paper differs in that we are trying to determine
optimal remedies for infringement rather than examining incentive effects of established
remedies.

3

Model

There are two risk neutral players, the innovator/victim (she) and the infringer (he). If
patent infringement does not occur, the innovator will become a monopoly and earn v,
and society gets residual consumer surplus W . The variable v is assumed to be random,
described by density function h and cumulative density function H, with support [0, ∞).
W > 0 is a constant. If patent infringement occurs, the innovator will earn 0, and society
gets surplus S > W .
The monopoly rent v is variable because of the possibility of post-patent efficiency gains,
which reduce the innovator-monopolist’s cost of supplying the market. The post-patent
efficiency gains can be realized only if the innovator gets a monopoly.7
7 There

are examples consistent with this structure. First, obtaining a patent can reduce the cost of
capital for the firm by reducing uncertainty and informational asymmetry (Hegde and Mishra, 2014).
Second, a patent can provide security that incentivizes a firm to make continuous enhancements in process
and quality. In the drug industry, for example, a pioneer patent holder will continue to improve its
production facilities and the quality of its product only if it retains its exclusive market protected by a
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The risk of loss to the innovator can be reduced by the exercise of caution by the
potential infringer, and it is costly for the infringer to take care. Caution in this setting,
comes in the form of care exercised in searching for the existence of the innovator’s patent.8
Let x denote the cost of taking care, p denote the probability of loss from infringement if
potential infringers do not take care, and q the probability of loss if infringers do take care.
Clearly x > 0 and p > q > 0.9
Although this model may seem to focus on accidental infringement, willful infringement
can be viewed as a special case where p approaches 1 and q approaches 0. The cost of
taking care can then be interpreted as the profit the infringer forgoes by not infringing the
patent.10
If patent infringement occurs, the innovator can choose to sue. Let cv denote the
litigation cost borne by a victim, and ci denote the litigation cost by an injurer in defending
himself against a claim. If the innovator’s suit is successful, the court will award the
innovator v + 4. The damages additur 4 is an adjustment to compensatory damages (lost
profits) that can be positive or negative in this analysis.
In comparison to previous studies on optimal damages (Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988)
and related literature), we modify the analysis by incorporating investment incentives. To
be specific, the innovator needs to determine whether to invest after learning the investment
patent; once the firm loses its market to a generic it no longer pursues such improvements (Blair and
Cotter, 2002). Our model assumes the post-patent efficiencies are on the cost side.
8 Once a search has revealed the existence of a valid patent, the infringer can take steps to reduce the
likelihood of infringement, for example by redesigning his product, seeking a license, or refraining from
entering the covered market (perhaps entering a different market) until the patent expires. Alternatively,
a search might lead the potential infringer to conclude that the likelihood of infringement is too small to
justify a change in strategy.
9 This model of “accidental” infringement is sufficiently broad to incorporate a wide range of scenarios.
It encompasses the problem of poor notice and uncertainty regarding the scope of rights in important
parts of the patent system, stressed by Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Lemley and Shapiro (2005). In
this model, the infringer can observe the monopoly rent that may be destroyed by his activity, but may
not be able to tell whether it is supported by a valid patent or the precise scope of the patent. Consider,
for example, Kodak’s decision to enter into the instant photography market in competition with Polaroid.
Kodak took care by searching, and attempting to design around Polaroid’s patents, but was still found
guilty of infringement (Bessen & Meurer, 2008, 50-51). Even the relatively clear rights observed in the
pharmaceutical sector may, in some cases, be consistent with this model. A potential infringer may observe
the monopoly rent and the existence of patent claims, but conclude that the validity of some or all of the
claims in light or prior art is highly uncertain.
10 However, uncertainty over patent validity or scope is still a necessary component, unless some other
transaction-cost barrier would prevent a license. Bessen and Meurer (2008, at 50) note that the cost of
searching in some industries may be so high that no rational infringer would conduct a search. Our model
includes this scenario too. Some infringers may conduct a preliminary assessment of the cost of search,
and upon finding it too high, decide not to search. Still, even in this case the infringer faces a decision to
proceed knowing that there is a risk of infringement that could be avoided if it did not go forward or if it
chose an alternative method. The cost of forgoing its planned method is then the cost of taking care.
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cost. The investment cost k is assumed to be random, distributed with density function φ
and cumulative density function Φ, with support [0, ∞).
The timeline of the game is as follows:
• Stage 0: Investment. The innovator observes the investment cost k and decides
whether to invest.
• Stage 1: Exercise of Caution. The value of patent v is realized. The injurer decides
whether to take care. If patent infringement does not occur, the game ends. The
innovator earns v and society gets W .
• Stage 2: Litigation. If patent infringement occurs, the innovator decides whether to
sue. If she does not sue, the game ends. The innovator gets 0 and the society gets
S. If the innovator sues, the two parties pay litigation costs cv and ci respectively.
Then the innovator gets v + 4, the injurer pays v + 4, and society gets S.
To obtain neater results, we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. (cv + ci )(p − q) > x.
The above assumption states that the cost of taking care is less than the decrease in
the total litigation cost. This assumption implies that if the injurer knows the victim is
going to sue when infringement occurs, he will take care.11 In section 6, we extend the
model to incorporate variable cost of care. We also impose the following assumptions on
the cost and value distributions.
φ(k)
Φ(k)
(p − q)v + q 1−H(v)
h(v)

Assumption 2. a)
b)

is decreasing in k.
is increasing in v.

The first part of this assumption requires the distribution of the cost variable to be not
too convex. All logconcave distributions (which includes most commonly used distributions,
such as uniform, logistic, Chi-square, and exponential) meet this restriction. The second
requires the distribution of monopoly value to be not too concave.12 These assumptions
11 The

victim sues only if v + 4 > cv . Given that the victim is going to sue, the benefit of taking care is
(p − q)(ci + 4 + v) > (p − q)(cv + ci ) > x, where x is the cost of taking care. So the injurer will always take
care if he knows the victim is going to sue.
12 When q = 0, all distributions meet this requirement. When q = p, any distributions less concave (more
convex) than the exponential distribution meet this requirement. The basic idea is, when pq goes to infinity,
most distributions meet this requirement; for example, the uniform distribution meets this requirement
when pq > 2 . When pq goes to 0, fewer distributions satisfy this requirement, but any distribution less
concave than exponential always meets this requirement regardless of pq .

6

make comparative statics analysis simpler and are not crucial for our main results. Loosely
speaking, these assumptions are used to ensure the marginal effect of damages on the
innovator’s incentive increases slower/decreases faster than society’s marginal cost.

4

Optimal Patent Damages

In this section, we consider the optimal patent damage. We analyze this problem by
backward induction.
t = 2: If the victim sues, she will get v + 4. Given any value of 4, the victim will sue
if and only if 4 + v > cv , or equivalently, v > cv − 4.13
t = 1: By assumption 1, we know that the injurer will take care if and only if he expects
the victim to sue at t = 2. That is, he will take care if and only if v > cv − 4.
t = 0: The innovator will invest when the value of patent V (4) > k, so the probability
of investment is Φ(V (4)).

4.1

Static Case

In this section, we first consider the static setting, where there is no investment concern.
For any 4, let V (4) denote the value of the patent to the innovator - that is, the
private value of the patent. The innovator will sue only when the value of her innovation
is large enough. Thus, the private value of the patent can be expressed as
V (4) = (1 − p)H(cv − 4)E(v | v ≤ cv − 4)
+ [1 − H(cv − 4)] [E(v | v > cv − 4) + q(4 − cv )] .
The first term reflects the case where the innovation has such a low value to the innovator
that she will not sue for infringement. In this case the innovation has positive value to the
innovator only if infringement does not occur. The second term reflects the case where the
innovation has sufficient value to induce the innovator to sue to protect it.
Note that when 4 ≥ cv , the above equation becomes
V (4) = E(v) + q(4 − cv ).
Thus, when suit is certain to be brought, because the damages additur exceeds the plaintiff’s cost of litigation, the value of the patent is the sum of the expected profit from the
13 To

break ties, we assume the victim will not sue (the injurer will not take care) if he is indifferent.
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innovation plus the expected net reward from litigation above and beyond compensation
for lost profits. Litigation occurs with frequency q because all potential infringers take care
when suit is certain to be brought. For this case, a larger damage amount always benefits
the innovator.14
Proposition 1. The private value of the patent, V (4), is strictly increasing in the damages
additur 4.
Proof. In the case where 4 ≥ cv , it is trivial that V 0 (4) = q > 0. When 4 < cv , we have
V 0 (4) = −(1 − p)(cv − 4)h(cv − 4) + (cv − 4)h(cv − 4)
+q [1 − H(cv − 4)] + q(4 − cv )h(cv − 4)
= (cv − 4)h(cv − 4)(p − q) + q [1 − H(cv − 4)] > 0
So V (4) is always strictly increasing in 4.
Similarly, we use M (4) to denote the social value of the patent given any value of 4:
M (4) = H(cv − 4) {pS + (1 − p) [W + E(v | v ≤ cv − 4)]}
+ [1 − H(cv − 4)] {qS + (1 − q) [W + E(v | v > cv − 4)]}
− [1 − H(cv − 4)] [x + q(cv + ci )] .
The social value of the patent is the sum of expected innovation surplus and patentee
profit, less the sum of the cost of taking care to avoid infringement and the expected total
cost of litigation. Note that when 4 ≥ cv , the above equation becomes
M (4) = qS + (1 − q) [W + E(v)] − x − q(cv + ci ),
which is the social value of the patent when infringement litigation is certain.
It follows that although the private value of the patent is always positive, the social
value is not necessarily positive in the static setting. The cost of taking care to avoid
infringement and the cost of infringement litigation may exceed the innovation surplus
from the patent. Indeed, given that the social value of the patent in a regime that bars
patent infringement litigation, pS + (1 − p)[W + E(v)], may be greater than the social value
of the patent when litigation is certain, it is not clear that infringement litigation enhances
social welfare in the static scenario. The intuitive reason is straightforward: in the absence
14 This

statement is not necessarily true in the case with variable cost of care. See section 5.1 for details.
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of substantial post-patent efficiencies, infringement necessarily enhances the innovation
surplus.
Returning to M (4), it is clear that when 4 ≥ cv , the social value of the patent is
independent of 4, because the innovator will always sue for any 4 ≥ cv , and 4 is simply
a transfer.
When 4 < cv , the effect of a change in 4, on the patent’s social value is
M 0 (4) = h(cv − 4) {(p − q) [(cv − 4) + (W − S)] − x − q(cv + ci )}
The first term in brackets, cv − 4, the only positive term in this expression, reflects that
increasing the damage award shifts the marginal patent from one that will not be defended
to one that will be defended. But this is at least partially offset by the negative effects:
the reduction in consumer surplus, and the increase in the cost of taking care and cost of
litigation.
+ci )+x
According to the above first order condition, when 4 ≤ cv + W − S − q(cvp−q
, M is
increasing in 4; otherwise M is decreasing in 4. In other words, given 4 < cv , M (4)
+ci )+x
is maximized at 4st = cv + W − S − q(cvp−q
, or equivalently, when v + 4st − cv = v +
+ci )+x
W − S − q(cvp−q
. It is easy to check that 4st is also the global maximizer. Since
+ci )+x
W − S − q(cvp−q
< 0, this implies the following.

Proposition 2. The optimal static damages additur, 4st , is less than the plaintiff’s cost
of litigation, cv .
These results can be easily verified in the following graph of M (4).15
15 Note

that throughout this paper, the graphs are used to illustrate the general trend rather than the
exact shape of variables. For example, we know M (4) always initially increases to a maximum, then
decrease, and finally becomes a constant as shown in Figure 1. But M (4) may not be concave as in
Figure 1. The same applies to all other figures.
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M (∆)

0

∆st

cv

∆

Figure 1: Illustration of M (∆)
Since infringement provides a payoff to society by expanding the innovation surplus,
social welfare may be optimized by discouraging some patent infringement litigation. Thus,
in the static setting it is not in society’s interest to encourage every patent infringement
victim to sue. Moreover, since the optimal damages additur may be negative, social welfare
may be enhanced by setting the compensation award at a level less than lost profits.
Of course, one may ask, why not provide full encouragement to infringement in the
static setting by dropping the additur to a level that completely eliminates the incentive to
bring suit? The answer is that post-patent efficiencies may justify some level of protection
from infringement. If the post-patent efficiencies (secured by the threat of infringement
litigation) are sufficiently strong, they may outweigh the social loss that would otherwise
result from deterring infringement.
The optimal static damages additur declines as the total surplus (S) increases relative
to the residual surplus (W ), which implies that as the consumer harm (S − W ) from
patent-based monopolization increases, other things held fixed, the optimal static additur
declines. Thus, the optimal static additur operates in part like a penalty that internalizes
consumer harm (Becker, 1968). The optimal static additur also declines as the cost of care
(x) and the cost of litigation (cv + ci ) increase relative to the productivity of care (p − q),
which is consistent with the results of studies of optimal damages in the general tort setting
(Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 1988, Hylton, 1990, Polinsky and Shavell, 2013).
Note that when W = S = 0, the current problem appears to reduce to the standard
tort litigation problem examined in Polinsky and Rubinfeld and related literature, and the
10

+ci )+x
optimal damages additur simplifies to cv − q(cvp−q
. One consistent result of the torts
literature is that the optimal tort damages additur could be as large as cv , but might be
smaller if the productivity of care is not high. This suggests that the model examined here
is one in which the productivity of care is not high. Why? The reason care is not highly
productive here is that the infringer decides whether to take care after observing v in this
model, while he acts before observing v in the torts setting. The decision to take care just
affects the marginal patent here, while the same decision affects all potential victims in the
torts context. However, even if this model were changed to adopt the same assumption as
the torts literature,16 the optimal static additur would still be less than the optimal tort
damages additur because of the negative externality W - S .
From the foregoing, M − V is the social externalilty from innovation. Recall that the
private value of the patent does not take into account the innovation surplus going to
consumers, the cost of taking care to avoid infringement, and the litigation cost of the
infringer. The social value does take these factors into account. It follows that the social
externality can be positive or negative depending on whether the sum of the cost of taking
care and the cost of litigation exceeds the innovation surplus. However, the effect of an
increase in damages on the social externality is relatively easy to determine.

Proposition 3. The social externality from innovation is strictly decreasing in the damages
additur, 4.
Proof. Proof. This statement is trivially true when 4 ≥ cv . When 4 < cv , we have
M (4) − V (4) = [1 − H(cv − 4)] [qS + (1 − q)W − qE(v | v > cv − 4)]
+H(cv − 4) [pS + (1 − p)W ]
− [1 − H(cv − 4)] [x + q(4 + ci )] .
The first derivative is
M 0 (4) − V 0 (4) = h(cv − 4) [(p − q)(W − S) − x − q(cv + ci )]
−q [1 − H(cv − 4)]
< 0.

16 The

model could be changed so that the potential infringer observes only E(v) rather than v, which
would make it equivalent to the torts model when W = S = 0. Thus, in a setting of even greater
uncertainty, where the potential infringer cannot determine the size of the monopoly rent destroyed by his
entry, one might find that the damages award has a stronger impact on social welfare.
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For expositional purposes, from here onwards, we use 4ex to denote the solution to
M (4) − V (4) = 0. At 4ex , the damages additur is the level where the social externality
is driven to zero.

4.2

Dynamic Case

Now we modify the analysis by incorporating the innovation incentive. The problem of
interest is to choose 4 to maximize society’s objective
ˆ
Π(4) = Φ(V (4))M (4) −

V (4)

kφ(k)dk,
0

where the first term is the expected social benefit from innovation, and the final term
subtracts off the cost of investment in innovation.
The first order condition for the social objective function is
Π0 (4) = φ(V (4))V 0 (4)M (4) + Φ(4)M 0 (4) − V (4)φ(4)V 0 (4)
= 0.
Rearranging, we obtain
M 0 (4) +

φ(4) 0
φ(∆) 0
V (4)M (4) =
V (∆)V (4).
Φ(4)
Φ(4)

Damages for patent infringement should be increased until the marginal social benefit
from an additional dollar (left hand side, LHS) equals its marginal social cost (right hand
side, RHS). The marginal social benefit reflects the social loss from expanding protection
from infringement (the static cost of intellectual property protection) and the marginal
innovation value to society of expanding protection (which may be positive or negative
depending on the social value of the patent). The marginal social innovation value is
shown to be the product of the elasticity of innovation with respect to an increase in
φ(∆) 0
damages ( Φ(∆)
V (∆)>0) and the social value of the patent. Turning to the right hand side
of the equation, the marginal social cost of increasing damages is unambiguously positive
and equal to the product of the innovation elasticity and the private value of the patent.
The marginal social cost is positive because a dollar increase in infringement damages
generates additional investment based on the private value of the patent.
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The first order condition can be rewritten as:
−M 0 (4) =

φ(V (4)) 0
V (4)[M (4) − V (4)]
Φ(V (4))

which reflects a balance between the static and dynamic effects of increasing damages
for patent infringement. The right hand side reflects the dynamic benefit of enhancing
infringement damages. Increasing damages generates more innovation, as reflected in the
positive elasticity term. Thus, if the social externality from innovation (M - V ) is positive,
increasing infringement damages enhances social welfare, and should be encouraged up
to the point where the marginal benefit is balanced off by the marginal social cost of
intellectual property protection.
Even from this preliminary analysis it is clear that the optimal static damages additur,
4st , is unlikely to be socially optimal when investment is sensitive to damages. If the
social first order condition above is evaluated at 4st , then M 0 (4st ) = 0, but the condition
is unlikely to be satisfied because the social and private values of the patent are generally
unequal when evaluated at 4st .
For expository purposes, let
LHS(∆) = −M 0 (∆)
and
RHS(4) =

φ(V (∆)) 0
V (∆)[M (∆) − V (∆)].
Φ(V (∆))

We know the shape of LHS(∆), the marginal static cost curve, based on Figure 1. The
graphs in Figures 2 through 4 illustrate solutions to the optimal damages problem. In each
of the three graphs below, LHS(∆), has the same general shape; crossing the horizontal
axis at the point of the optimal static damages additur 4st , and then lying on the horizontal
axis for levels of the additur above the plaintiff’s cost of litigation. The reason LHS(∆) is
flat for ∆ ≥ cv is that all patentees sue and all infringers take care once ∆ = cv , so the social
cost of protection is invariant to additional increases in the additur. The different outcomes
in the three graphs below can therefore be explained entirely by RHS(∆), the marginal
dynamic benefit. We will emphasize intuition here and leave proofs for the appendix.
The first graph (Figure 2: Case 1) shows the case where the social externality from
the innovation is negative when suit is certain (∆ = cv ) and positive in the neighborhood
of the optimal static additur. Here the optimal damages additur is definitely less than
the victim’s litigation cost. For the particular solution illustrated, litigation is encouraged
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relative to the static scenario, but not so much as to lead all victims of patent infringement
to bring suit.
In the second graph (Figure 3: Case 2), the social externality from the patent is positive
and the marginal dynamic benefit exceeds the marginal static cost when suit is certain.
The high social externality shown in the graph corresponds to instances where the expected redisual innovation surplus substantially exceeds the sum of expected litigation and
infringement avoidance costs and the innovation elasticity is relatively large. For this case,
the optimal damages additur is found where the social externality is driven to zero, and
therefore the private and social values of the patent are equal. The damages additur that
achieves this outcome is
4ex = 4̄ ≡ S − E(v) − ci +

(1 − q)W − x
.
q

Note that
V (4̄) = E(v) + q(4̄ − cv )
= qS + (1 − q)[W + E(v)] − x − q(cv + ci )
which equals the social value from the innovation, M (4̄). Thus the optimal damages
remedy in this case, 4̄, induces the innovator to make the socially efficient investment
decision by giving her the entire social value of her investment. For this outcome to hold,
the marginal dynamic benefit - the elasticity of innovation multiplied by the innovation
externality - must exceed the marginal static cost when suit is certain.
The third graph (Figure 4: Case 3) illustrates the more complicated case where the
social externality is positive when suit is certain, but the marginal dynamic benefit is less
than the marginal static cost of increasing damages when suit is certain. Now there are
two potential solutions to the optimal damages problem. The lowest one is between the
optimal static additur and cv . The other solution is 4̄. Because of the discontinuity in
marginal static cost, it is impossible to say a priori which solution is globally preferable.
There is actually a fourth case to be considered, really a special case of the first, not
shown but intuitively obvious, and that is where the social externality is negative even when
evaluated at the optimal static additur. In this case the optimal additur is unambiguously
less than the optimal static additur. The social value of the patent is sufficiently negative
that it is socially preferable to discourage infringement lawsuits even more than in the
static setting, in part to discourage the act of innovation itself.
To elaborate on this counterintuitive scenario, recall that in the static case, the optimal
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damages amount is smaller than that for the usual tort. One would usually think, because
the innovator does not internalize the full social benefit of innovation, we should give her
more than in the static case to encourage investment. This is true when 4st < 4ex < cv .
But it could be true that 4ex < 4st , in which case the optimal damages award is not only
smaller than that for the usual tort, but even smaller than that for the static case. The
social planner would discourage rather than encourage innovation. The innovator does
not care about the society’s benefit from innovation and so may under-invest; at the same
time, he does not care about the society’s cost in protecting the patent (ci and x), so he
also has incentives to over-invest. When the external benefit is small and the external cost
is large, the social planner may want to lower damages to discourage the investment. This
can also be easily seen from this simple example:
Example: Suppose v is uniformly distributed on [0, 10]. S = 1, W = 0, cv = ci = 15,
x = 5, p = 1, q = 0. So 4st = 9. It is relatively cheaper to take care, society’s loss in
welfare is relatively low, and the litigation cost is high. Given innovation that has already
occurred, the social planner finds it optimal to induce the injurer to take care provided
that v is not too small (v > 6). The innovator will earn a rent of 3.2 and thus will choose to
invest when cost is, say 3. However, the society has to bear an additional expected cost 2
of taking care, only to get an expected benefit of 0.4. So the social value of this innovation
is 1.6, less than the innovation cost. Such an investment should be discouraged, rather
than encouraged.
∆ = cv
LHS(cv )

∆st

∆ex

∆
RHS(cv )

LHS(∆)

RHS(∆)

Figure 2: Case 1
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∆ = cv

RHS(cv )
LHS(cv )
¯
∆ex = ∆

∆st

LHS(∆)

∆

RHS(∆)

Figure 3: Case 2
]
∆ = cv
LHS(cv )
RHS(cv )
∆st

¯
∆ex = ∆

LHS(∆)

∆

RHS(∆)

Figure 4: Case 3
The foregoing graphs show that the optimal damages additur will either balance static
cost and dynamic benefit on the margin, or, if the social externality from innovation is
sufficiently large, drive the marginal dynamic benefit to zero by equating the social and
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private value of innovation. For a given private valuation, the social externality from
innovation increases as the innovation surplus to consumers increases relative to the sum
of the cost of taking care and the cost of litigation. The practical implication of these
graphs is the following statement.
Proposition 4. The optimal damages additur is always smaller than or equal to the greater
of the plaintiff’s cost of litigation and the amount that internalizes the social benefit from the
innovation - i.e., 4∗ max{cv , 4̄}. Moreover, the optimal additur lies between the optimal
static additur and the amount that internalizes the social benefit from the innovation i.e.min{4st , 4ex } ≤ 4∗ ≤ max{4st , 4ex }.

4.3

Comparative Statics

The comparative statics are straightforward and intuitive. In the case where the patent
has a high social value, and the optimal additur is unambiguously larger than cv (Case 2),
it is clear that the optimal damages additur increases with S and W , decreases with ci
and x, and is unaffected by changes in cv . The reason follows from the function of the
damages additur in this case, which is to internalize the social benefit from investment.
Since cv is already internalized in the innovator’s investment decision, the optimal additur
is independent of it. In the case where the patent has a comparatively low social value, and
the optimal additur is unambiguously less than cv (Case 1), the analysis is more tricky,
because when 4ex < 4st , there may exists multiple local maximum of Π. However, if we
restrict attention to the case where there exists a unique local maximum, the comparative
statics results are similar, with the only difference observed in the effect of cv .
Proposition 5. If the optimal damages additur is less than cv , then an increase in x, ci
will lead to a decrease in the optimal damages additur, and an increase in W will lead
to an increase in the optimal additur. An increase in cv has an ambiguous effect on the
optimal additur.
The effect of an increase in S on the optimal damages additur is also ambiguous because
M 0 is decreasing in S and M − V is increasing in S. An upward shift of the distribution
of the cost function in general has an ambiguous effect. When 4st < 4∗ < 4ex - that is,
when the social planner feels the need to encourage investment - an upward shift of the
cost function leads to an increase in optimal 4 . When 4ex < 4∗ < 4st - that is, when the
social planner feels the need to discourage investment-an upward shift of the cost function
leads to a decrease in optimal 4 .
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5
5.1

Extensions
Variable Cost of Care

In this section, we extend the model to incorporate the case where the injurer’s cost
of taking care varies. Specifically, we assume that x is distributed according to some
distribution with pdf g and cdf G, with support x ∈ [0, ∞). Introducing variable care
changes the model mainly be potentially amplifying the effect of an increase in the damages
additur on the degree to which potential infringers take care. Still, we hope to show that
most of the conclusions of the previous part remain reliable. We have relegated some
details to the appendix.
In this case, the injurer will take care only if (1) the innovator will sue and (2) x <
(p−q)(v +4+ci ). So conditional on the innovator credibly threatening to sue, the infringer
will take care with probability G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci )).
The general optimality condition, balancing the marginal static cost against dynamic
benefit, still holds, with the same intuition. Letting V̂ denote the private value of the
patent,
ˆ

ˆ

cv −4

V̂ (4) = (1 − p)

∞

vh(v)dv +
0

ˆ

vh(v)dv
cv −4

∞

+q(4 − cv )

G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))h(v)dv
c −4
ˆ v∞

+p(4 − cv )

[1 − G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci )]h(v)dv
cv −4

When 4 < cv , this is increasing in 4. When 4 ≥ cv ,
ˆ
0

∞

V̂ (4) = q + (p − q)
g((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))h(v)dv
0
(´ ∞
)
[1
−
G((p
−
q)(v
+
4
+
c
))]
h(v)dv
i
× 0 ´∞
− (p − q)(4 − cv ) .
0 g((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))h(v)dv
Unlike in the baseline model, the patent’s private value may not be strictly increasing in
the damages additur for values of the additur greater than the plaintiff’s cost of litigation.17
This is explained by two revenue effects: (a) the patentee gets more revenue from every case
of infringement (direct effect), and (b) some potential infringers switch from not taking
care to taking care (indirect effect), which reduces revenue. If 4 gets sufficiently large and
17 In

the appendix, we provide an example where V̂ 0 (4) eventually becomes negative.
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if G has a sufficiently fat tail, the indirect revenue effect caused by switching may dominate
the direct effect (see appendix for an example). It follows that, unlike the baseline model,
there may be a privately optimal damages additur that maximizes the value of the patent
to the innovator.
The social value of the patent is also more complicated than in the baseline model. The
patent’s social value is now given by
M̂ (4) = (1 − p)[E(v) + W ] + p(S − cv − ci )
ˆ ∞
+
G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))(p − q)[(v + W ) − (S − cv − ci )]h(v)dv
0

ˆ
−

∞

ˆ

xg(x)dx h(v)dv


0



(p−q)(v+4+ci )

0

This can be interpreted as the social value when potential infringers do not take care (first
line) plus the expected welfare increment that results from being induced to take care. The
first derivative is
M̂ 0 (4) = h(cv − 4){(p − q)(cv − 4 + W − S)G((p − q)(cv + ci ))
ˆ (p−q)(cv +ci )
−
xg(x)dx − (cv + ci )[p − (p − q)G((p − q)(cv + ci ))]}
0
ˆ ∞
2
+(p − q)
[(cv − 4 + W − S)g((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))] h(v)dv
cv −4

Suppose the static externality is zero, that is, W = S = 0, which enables comparison with
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), Hylton (1990), and Polinsky and Shavell (2013). In this
case, note that setting 4 = cv may be a local solution to the first order condition. But it is
unlikely to be a global solution, in contrast to the torts literature, because the derivative
is likely negative as soon as you reduce 4 below cv . Recall that unlike the torts literature,
the infringer observes v before deciding whether to take care, which limits the productivity
of care in comparison to the torts context.18
It is impossible to get a closed form solution for the optimal additur in this more
complicated version, but we can show that the main results of the baseline model still
hold. The first term of the first derivative of M̂ crosses 0 only once, at
41 = c v + W − S −

p − (p − q)G((p − q)(cv + ci )
(cv + ci )
(p − q)G((p − q)(cv + ci ))

18 As

noted earlier, if we assume instead that the infringer observes only E(v) and not v, then care would
be more productive and the result of the tort damages literature would emerge as a special case.
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´ (p−q)(cv +ci )
as (p − q)(cv − 4 + W − S)G((p − q)(cv + ci )) − 0
xg(x)dx − (cv + ci )[p − (p −
q)G((p − q)(cv + ci ))]) is decreasing in 4. So is the second term, and it crosses 0 at
42 = c v + W − S
Clearly 41 < 42 . Though we don’t know if the solution to M̂ 0 (4) = 0 is unique, we do
know that any solution should lie between 41 and 42 . Moreover, the social value of patent
is always decreasing in 4 beyond cv . So the static optimal damage 4̂st must be smaller
than cv . Finally, the social externality of the patent V̂ -M̂ is always decreasing, as in the
baseline model (we refer interested readers to the appendix for the proof).
From here it is not difficult to compare the results of this version with the baseline
model. Returning to Figures 2 through 4, the graph now changes so that the static cost
curve, LHS (∆), is upward sloping even after the point 4 = cv . If the shape of the dynamic
cost curve, RHS (∆), is as regular as shown, then the optimal additur will be less than the
greater of cv and the amount that internalizes the social benefit from innovation, as in the
baseline model.

5.2

Optimal Injunction

Much of the preceding analysis can be applied to the determination of an optimal injunction, which we consider here. The timeline of the game is very similar to that of the optimal
damages case. The only difference is that at stage 2, if the innovator sues, an injunction
will be issued. We use θ ∈ [0, 1] to denote the scope of the injunction (i.e, extent or probability). If a injunction of scope θ is issued, the innovator gets θv, the injurer pays 0, the
society gets θS + (1 − θ)W . For example, θ could be interpreted simply as the duration of
the injunction. If the injunction has the full duration, θ = 1 , then the innovator obtains
the full profits promised by the patent grant, and consumers receive none of the benefits
from infringement. We assume that an injunction issues immediately and prevents the
infringement from occurring.
To simplify, we will use a modified version of Assumption 1 to ensure that the injurer
will take care provided that the victim is going to sue when infringement occurs.
Assumption 3. (p − q)ci > x.
Then the innovator will sue if and only if
θv > cv .
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For any θ > 0, the above equation can be rewritten as,19
cv
.
θ
Given any θ, the private value of the patent to the innovator is
v>

cv
cv
)E(v | v ≤ )
θ 
θ

cv
cv
+[1 − H( )] [1 − q(1 − θ)]E(v | v > ) − qcv
θ
θ

V (θ) = (1 − p)H(

and its first derivative is
cv cv
cv
V (θ) = h( )( 2 )(p − q) + q
θ θ
θ
0

ˆ

∞
cv
θ

vh(v)dv > 0

Hence, V is increasing in θ. The innovator will only invest when V (θ) > c , so the probability
of investment is Φ(V (θ)).
The social value of the patent is
cv
cv
) pS + (1 − p)[W + E(v | v ≤ )]
θ
θ


cv
cv
+[1 − H( )] q(1 − θ)S + [1 − q(1 − θ)][W + E(v | v > )
θ
θ
cv
−[1 − H( )][x + q(cv + ci )]
θ




M (θ) = H(

and its first derivative is
cv cv
cv
)( 2 ) [p − q(1 − θ)] ( + W − S) − x − q(cv + ci )
θ θ
θ


cv
cv
+q[1 − H( )] W − S + E(v | v > ) .
θ
θ

M 0 (θ) = h(





0

(θ)
The above equation is always positive as θ goes to 0, and M
h( cθv ) is decreasing in θ. So
it either crosses 0 once or remains positive till θ = 1. Thus we know either M is always
increasing, or first increases to a maximum and then decreases. The result slightly differs
from the optimal damages case because we cannot let θ go to infinity as 4. So at full
injunction, the society’s marginal benefit of protection may still be positive.
19 It

is not hard to verify that the first order derivative is positive at θ = 0, so θ = 0 is never optimal.
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The social externalilty from the innovation is
cv
) [pS + (1 − p)W ]
θ
cv
+[1 − H( )] {q(1 − θ)(S − W ) + W − x − qci } .
θ

M (θ) − V (θ) = H(

Again, we derive the first derivative of the above equation
cv
cv
)h( ) {(W − S)[p − q(1 − θ)] − x − qci }
2
θ
θ
cv
−q(S − W )[1 − H( )]
θ
< 0.

M 0 (θ) − V 0 (θ) = (

So we know M − V is decreasing in θ.
From this point, much of the preceding analysis can be replicated. The social optimality
condition balances marginal static cost and dynamic benefit
−M 0 (θ) =

φ(V (θ)) 0
V (θ)[M (θ) − V (θ)].
Φ(V (θ))

Again, the marginal dynamic benefit is the product of the innovation elasticity and the
social externality from the patent. If it is positive, the scope of the injunction should be
increased to the point that it is equal to the marginal static cost of intellectual property
protection. Obviously, a corner solution of full scope will be observed when the marginal
dynamic benefit exceeds the marginal static cost at the full protection level.
We conclude the section by showing that a combination of damages and an injunction
may strictly dominate using either damages or injunction alone. Suppose v is uniformly
distributed on [0, 10], W = 4 , S = 10, p = 1, q = 0.5, x = 0.25, cv = ci = 1. To better
illustrate the idea, we assume the investment cost is fixed at c = 3.5. If the court uses
only damages, then the optimal damages additur is 4∗ = −2, at which the expected social
welfare is 5.8. Similarly, if the court uses only an injunction, the optimal injunction is 0.61,
at which the expected social welfare is 5.33. The following rule, full injunction if v > 6
and 4 = −2 when v < 6, gives the innovator a value of 3.9. So the innovator will invest.
It also gives a social welfare of 6.15. The intuition for this result is simple. When v is
large, monopolization is efficient for the society, so we should choose injunction. On the
contrary, when v is small, monopolization is bad for the society, the court only protects
the patent for the investment incentive, so it is more efficient to use damage to compensate
the innovator and keep a competitive market.
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6

Discussion

While the literature on optimal patent scope and term has posed the social planner’s objective as minimizing the deadweight loss for a given level of reward for innovation, our
approach has been to set up a simple objective of maximizing the social gain from innovation net of the cost of investment. Patent protection imposes a static monopolization cost
but also induces the investment that creates the very market the innovator will monopolize
if patent protection is sufficiently strong. The only instrument of interest here is the level
of damages for patent infringement. As the level of damages increases, the effective degree
of patent protection also increases. Our model delivers an intuitive optimality condition
that balances, on the margin, the static cost of intellectual property protection against
the “dynamic” benefit from encouraging innovation. Moreover, this model yields a specific
formulation for the dynamic benefit: the product of the innovation elasticity and the social
externality from the patent.
We find that the optimal damages award for patent infringement exceeds the sum of
lost profits and the plaintiff’s litigation cost if the social value of the patent - that is, the
expected social surplus net of the expected costs of litigation and of taking care to avoid
infringement - is sufficiently high. This is interesting for several reasons. First, in comparison to the literature on tort damages, it shows that optimal damages for infringement of
intellectual property may exceed the upper bound on optimal damages for ordinary torts
(negligence cases), which is equal to the sum of compensatory damages and the plaintiff’s
litigation cost.
The upper bound on optimal damages for patent infringement derived here is the sum
of lost profits and the amount that internalizes to the innovator the expected social gain
from her investment in innovation. The baseline model examined (in which the cost of
care is sufficiently low that a credible threat to sue for infringement always induces care),
delivers a simple closed-form solution in which the upper bound on optimal damages is the
sum of lost profits and the expected consumer surplus from the patent net of the expected
litigation and precautionary costs borne by the infringer. This latter amount can easily
exceed the plaintiff’s litigation cost if the value of the innovation is high.
For the law, the results here provide some support for the Supreme Court’s decision in
Octane Fitness, which overturned rules adopted by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
making it difficult for a prevailing litigant to obtain an award of attorney’s fees in a patent
infringement lawsuit. The previous rule, from Brooks Furniture v. Dutailier,20 required an
objectively baseless lawsuit brought in subjectively bad faith in order to receive attorney’s
20 393

F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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fees. The Court held instead that an unusually weak legal case on the opposing side, based
on the facts or the law, could justify attorney’s fees. More importantly, the results here
lend support to the broader argument that the legal standard for enhanced damages should
be relaxed in a similar fashion.21
This model suggests that the patent’s social value should play a role in determining
whether supercompensatory patent infringement awards - damages exceeding lost profits
- are appropriate. In particular, under this model, supercompensatory damages may be
optimal in the case of infringement of a patent with a high social value. An example might
be a patent on a life-saving medical innovation. For such innovation, the externality to
society is large, even under monopoly. Bessen and Meurer (2008) find that the private
value for pharmaceutical patents generally exceeds expected litigation costs by a substantial margin, which implies that the many such patents have sufficiently high social value
to justify awarding infringement damages greater than lost profits. On the other hand,
for areas where the social externality from innovation is likely to be low and infringement
difficult to determine (meaning high costs of litigation and taking care to avoid infringement), this model suggests that damages less than lost profits may be optimal.22 In many
of these cases the patentee will lose his infringement claim anyway.
Treble damages are permitted under the Patent Act (Section 285) in cases of willful
infringement. Willful infringement corresponds in our model to instances where the cost
of taking care is simply the profit forgone by not infringing the patent, and the probability
of infringement is nearly one when the firm does not take care and nearly zero when the
firm does take care. If infringement induces follow-on entrants, the profit forgone by not
infringing the patent will be modest. Our baseline model easily includes this intentional
infringement scenario. Thus, when the damages additur that internalizes the social value
of innovation is greater than twice lost profits, the optimal damages award will exceed the
treble damages cap.
21 For

a discussion of the issues, see Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2015). In rejecting Halo’s request for a full circuit review of a panel decision rejecting its motion
for enhanced damages, the court noted that the patent statute by its terms gives enormous discretion to
judges on the matter of enhanced damages.
22 It should be clear that if infringement offers greater benefits than assumed in this model, the case
for reducing damages only strengthens. The model can be extended to incorporate such concerns. For
example, if infringement enhances additional innovation, then it would be desirable to encourage more
infringement. Such a case might be presented where innovation is both sequential and complementary, as
in Bessen & Maskin (2009).
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7

Conclusion

Patent infringement remedies may provide the best measure of the degree of intellectual
property protection offered by the legal system. A government can award a patentee
an infinite term and all-encompassing scope, but if infringement remedies are feeble, the
effective level of protection will be quite low.
We derive an intuitively appealing condition that governs optimal damages, balancing
on the margin the static monopolization cost against the dynamic innovation benefit. If
the social value of the patent is sufficiently high, the optimal damages award may exceed
the lost profits standard, up to a limit that internalizes the net external benefit from the
innovation.
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Appendix
Optimal Damage
Recall the first derivative of Π(4) is
Π0 (4) = φ(V (4))V 0 (4)[M (4) − V (4)] + Φ(V (4))M 0 (4).

(1)

As in the text, we use 4st to denote the solution to
M 0 (4) = 0,
and use 4ex to denote the solution to
M (4) − V (4) = 0.
We have already show that both solutions are unique. Moreover, M 0 (4) is strictly negative
for 4 < 4st and is positive otherwise; M (4) − V (4) is strictly positive for 4 < 4ex and
negative otherwise. So if 4ex = 4st , the optimal damage is trivially 4st . Otherwise, a
solution to the first order condition always exists and must lie between 4st and 4ex .
To find the optimal damage 4∗ , we consider three cases.
Case 1: qS + (1 − q)W − qE(v) < x + q(cv + ci ).
The above inequality implies that
M (cv ) − V (cv ) < 0,
or equivalently, 4ex < cv .
From earlier analysis, we also know that , 4st is always smaller than cv . So Π0 (4) is
negative for all 4 > cv . The optimal damage 4∗ must be smaller than cv . This is the case
represented by Figure 2.
In what follows, we show when 4st < 4ex , there exists a unique solution to equation
1, which maximizes Π. We also illustrate why this may not be true when 4st > 4ex .
For illustrative purpose, for 4 < cv , let
L(4) =
=

Π0 (4)
Φ(V (4))h(cv − 4)
φ(V (4)) 0
Φ(V (4)) V (4)[M (4) − V (4)]

h(cv − 4)
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+

M 0 (4)
.
h(cv − 4)

(2)

As any solution to Π0 (4) = 0 must lie in (4st , 4ex ). To show Π0 (4) = 0 has a unique
solution, it suffices to show the above equation is strictly decreasing when 4 < 4ex . Recall
that in section 4.2, we defined the following notations:
LHS(∆) = −M 0 (∆),
and
RHS(4) =

φ(V (∆)) 0
V (∆)[M (∆) − V (∆)].
Φ(V (∆))

So equation 2 can be rewritten as
L(4) =

RHS(4) LHS(4)
−
h(cv − 4) h(cv − 4)

In the above equation,
RHS(4)
=
h(4 − cv )
=

φ(V (4)) 0
Φ(V (4)) V (4)[M (4) − V (4)]

h(cv − 4)
φ(V (4))
× [M (4) − V (4)]
Φ(V (4))
"
#
1 − H(cv − 4)
× (cv − 4)(p − q) + q
h(cv − 4)

φ(V (4))
1−H(cv −4)
In the above equation, both Φ(V
(4)) and (cv − 4)(p − q) + q h(cv −4) are decreasing in 4
by assumption 2 .M (4) − V (4) is strictly decreasing. Finally, all three terms are positive
when 4st < 4 < 4ex < cv . Then RHS(4)
h(4−cv ) is decreasing in 4 when 4 < cv .
In addition, we have Now consider

−LHS(4)
M 0 (4)
=
h(cv − 4)
h(cv − 4)
= (p − q) [(cv − 4) + W − S] − x − q(cv + ci ))
which is clearly strictly decreasing in 4. So L is decreasing on (−∞, 4ex ) as desired.
Indeed, the foregoing arguments imply that L is decreasing when 4 < min{cv , 4ex }. We
will use this implication in the following parts. Thus the solution to the first order condition
is unique.
Use 4∗ to denote the solution. The last step is to check the second order condition:
Π00 (4∗ ) < 0.
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By foregoing arguments, we have
v −4)
Π00 (4∗ )Φ(V (4∗ ))h(cv − 4∗ ) + Π0 (4∗ ) ∂Φ(V (4)))h(c
|4=4∗
∂L∗
∂4
=
∂4∗
[Φ(V (4∗ ))h(cv − 4∗ )]2
< 0

and Π0 (4∗ ) = 0. So it directly follows that Π00 (4∗ ) < 0. So 4∗ is indeed a global maximizer
of Π.
The previous analysis does not apply to the case where 4ex < 4st because although
M (4) − V (4) is still decreasing, it is negative on (4ex , 4st ). So we can no longer conclude
that L is always strictly decreasing on (4ex , 4st ).
Case 2& Case 3: Suppose qS + (1 − q)W − qE(v) ≥ x + q(cv + ci ), then we have
4ex = 4̄ ≡ S − E(v) − ci +

(1 − q)W − x
≥ cv .
q

Note that the above inequality implies that 4st < cv ≤ 4ex . It is easy to show that
Π0 (4) > 0 for cv < 4 < 4̄, Π0 (4) < 0 for 4 > 4̄. So 4̄ is the only local maximizer on
[cv , ∞).
Then we need to consider two subcases.
Case 2:qS + (1 − q)W − qE(v) ≥ x + q(cv + ci ) and RHS(cv ) > LHS(cv ).
Since L is decreasing when 4 < min{cv , 4ex } = cv , we then have L(4) > 0 ⇐⇒
0
Π (4) > 0 for all 4 ≤ cv . So there is no local maximizer on (−∞, cv ]. Then the optimal damage must be
(1 − q)W − x
4̄ = S − ci +
.
q
This is the case represented by Figure 2.
Case 3: qS + (1 − q)W − x ≥ q(cv + ci ) and RHS(cv ) ≤ LHS(cv ).
LHS(4)
Then we have Π0 (cv ) = h(0)L(cv ) ≤ 0. Moreover, h(c
→ −∞ and RHS(4)
h(cv −4) → ∞ as
v −4)
4 → −∞. Then there exists y such that Π0 (4) = h(cv − 4)L(4) > 0 for all 4 < y. L is
strictly decreasing when 4 < cv and continuous, so there exists a unique 4̃ which is smaller
than cv and solves Π0 (4) = 0. It is easy to check that the corresponding second derivative
Π00 (4̃) = L0 (4̃)h(cv − 4)Φ(V (4) + L(4̃)[h(cv − 4)Φ(V (4)]0
< 0.
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So 4̃ is indeed a local maximizer. However, as shown above, 4̄ > cv is also a local maximizer. In this case, we need to compare M (4a ) and M (4b ) to find out the damage amount
that maximizes the society’s benefit. This is the case illustrated by Figure 4.
Comparative Statics (Proposition 5)
Here we derive comparative statics for Case 1 (qS + (1 − q)W − qE(v) < x + q(cv + ci ), the
optimal damage is unambiguously smaller than cv ), assuming unique local maximum.
∂L∗
Use 4∗ to denote the optimal damage. Then it follows that L∗ ≡ L(4∗ ) = 0 and ∂4
∗ < 0.
Moreover,


∂
∂L∗
=
∂x

0
∗
φ(V (4∗ )) V 0 (4∗ )
∗ ) − V (4∗ ] + M (4 )
[M
(4
∗
∗
Φ(V (4 )) h(cv −4 )
h(cv −4∗ )

∂x

M (4∗ )−V (4∗ )
M 0 (4∗ )
and
∗
h(cv −4 )
h(cv −4∗ )
∂L∗
positive. So ∂x < 0. Then we



.

φ(V (4∗ )) 0
∗
Φ(V (4∗ )) V (4 )

In the above equation,

are decreasing in x,

is

constant in x and
and conclude

can use the implicit function theorem

∗

∂L
∂4∗
∂x < 0
= − ∂L
∗
∂x
∂4∗

That is, the optimal damage decreases when x increases.
∗
∂4∗
∂L∗
Similarly, one can show ∂L
∂W > 0 and ∂ci < 0. And thus ∂W > 0 and
the optimal damage increases when W or/and ci increases.
Now we consider the effect of change in cv . Note that

∂4∗
∂ci

< 0. That is,

V (4∗ ) = (1 − p)H(cv − 4∗ )E(v | v ≤ cv − 4∗ )
+ [1 − H(cv − 4∗ )] [E(v | v > cv − 4∗ ) + q(4∗ − cv )] .
= (1 − p)E(v) + [1 − H(cv − 4∗ )] [pE(v | v > cv − 4∗ ) + q(4∗ − cv )]
is decreasing in cv . So in L∗ ,

φ(V (4))
Φ(V (4))

is increasing in cv . Moreover,

V 0 (4∗ )
1 − H(cv − 4∗ )
∗
=
(p
−
q)(c
−
4
)
+
q
v
h(cv − 4∗ )
h(cv − 4∗ )
is increasing in cv , M (4∗ ) − V (4∗ )is increasing in cv and is positive if 4ex > 4st . The
last term (p − q)[S − W − cv + 4∗ ] + x + q(cv + ci ) is certainly increasing in cv when p > 2q,
∗
otherwise ambiguous. So when4ex > 4st and p > 2q, we have ∂L
∂cv > 0 which implies an
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increase in cv results in a decrease in 4∗ . This refer to the circumstances where innovation
needs to be encouraged and taking care is relatively effective. Otherwise, the effect of
change of cv on 4∗ is ambiguous.
Lastly, we investigate how a shift of cost distribution affects 4∗ . To be precise, we
replace φ with φε such that
φε (k) = φ(k − ε)
Φε (k) = Φ(k − ε).
A positive ε represents an upward shift and a negative ε represents an downward shift of
the cost distribution . The new first derivative becomes
Π0ε (4) = φε (V (4))V 0 (4)[M (4) − V (4)] + Φε (V (4))M 0 (4)
And we denote
Lε (4) =
=
=
∗

Π0ε (4)
h(cv − 4)
φε (V (4)) 0
0
Φε (V (4)) V (4)[M (4) − V (4)] + M (4)

h(cv − 4)
φ(V (4)−ε) 0
0
Φ(V (4)−ε) V (4)[M (4) − V (4)] + M (4)
h(cv − 4)
∗

φ(V (4 )−ε)
φ(V (4 ))
∗
∗
When ε > 0, Φ(V
(4∗ )−ε) > Φ(V (4∗ )) . If 4ex > 4st , then M (4 ) − V (4 ) > 0, which implies
Lε (4∗ ) > 0 ⇒ Π0ε (4∗ ) > 0 at 4∗ . So the new optimal damage must be greater than 4∗ .
Otherwise, the new optimal damage is smaller than 4∗ .
So an upward shift of φ result in an increase of optimal damage when 4ex > 4st , and
result in a decrease of optimal damage otherwise. The opposite conclusion holds for a
downward shift of φ.

Variable Cost of Care
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The private value of the patent is
ˆ

ˆ

cv −4

V̂ (4) = (1 − p)

∞

vh(v)dv +
0

ˆ

vh(v)dv
cv −4

∞

+q(4 − cv )

G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))h(v)dv
c −4
ˆ v∞

+p(4 − cv )

[1 − G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci )]h(v)dv
cv −4

which can be rewritten
ˆ

∞

V̂ (4) = (1 − p)E(v) +

{pv − [p − (p − q)G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))](cv − 4)} h(v)dv.
cv −4

Note that the innovator will sure only ifv > cv − 4. So when 4 < cv , in the second
term, pv − [p − (p − q)G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))](cv − 4) > pv + p(4 − cv ) > 0. Moreover, both
p − (p − q)G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci )) and cv − 4 are positive and decreasing in 4. So pv −
[p − (p − q)G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))](cv − 4) is increasing in 4. And thus the second term is
also increasing in 4. Thus, when 4 < cv , the private value of the patent is increasing in
4. As we note in the text, the private value is not necessarily increasing for 4 ≥ cv . For
g(x)
example, suppose, q = 0, p = 1 and g ∼ exp(λg ), then 1−G(x)
= λg for all x. In this case,
when 4 ≥ cv ,
ˆ
0

(´ ∞

∞

g(v + 4 + ci )h(v)dv ×

V̂ (4) =

0

0

ˆ
=

0

∞

)

[1 − G(v + 4 + ci )] h(v)dv
´∞
− (4 − cv )
0 g(v + 4 + ci )h(v)dv

"

#

1
g(v + 4 + ci )h(v)dv
− (4 − cv )
λg

which turns negative as 4 → ∞.
When 4 ≥ cv , the social value equation becomes
M̂ (4) = (1 − p)[E(v) + W ] + p(S − cv − ci )
ˆ ∞
+
G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))(p − q)(v + W + cv + ci − S)h(v)dv
0

ˆ
−

∞

ˆ

xg(x)dx h(v)dv.


0



(p−q)(v+4+ci )

0
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Then
ˆ
0

∞

2

M̂ (4) = (p − q)

g((p − q)(v + 4 + ci )(W − S + cv − 4)h(v)dv
0

< 0
for all 4 > cv .
The social externality is
ˆ

∞

M̂ (4) − V̂ (4) =

G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))[(1 − q)W + q(S − v − 4 − ci )]h(v)dv
cv −4
ˆ ∞

[1 − G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))][(1 − p)W + p(S − v − 4 − ci )]h(v)dv

+
cv −4

ˆ

∞

−

ˆ

xg(x)dx h(v)dv + H(cv − 4)[pS + (1 − p)W ]


cv −4



(p−q)(v+4+ci )

0

The first derivative of M − V is
M̂ 0 (4) − V̂ 0 (4) = h(cv − 4)G((p − q)(cv + ci ))(p − q)(W − S)
+h(cv − 4)(cv + ci )[G((p − q)(cv + ci ))(p − q) − p]
ˆ

(p−q)(cv +ci )
−h(cv − 4) 
xg(x)dx
ˆ

0
∞

(p − q)2 g((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))(W − S)h(v)dv

+
c −4

ˆv ∞
−q

G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))h(v)dv
c −4
ˆ v∞

−p

[1 − G((p − q)(v + 4 + ci ))]h(v)dv
cv −4

Note that W − S < 0, and G((p − q)(cv + ci ))(p − q) − p < 0, so clearly all terms in the above
equation are negative. Thus M 0 − V 0 is always negative and M − V is always decreasing.
Optimal Injunction
The society’s objective function is
ˆ
Π(θ) = Φ(V (θ))M (θ) −

cφ(c)dc.
0
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V (θ)

The first order derivative is
Π0 (θ) = φ(V (θ))V 0 (θ)[M (θ) − V (θ)] + Φ(V (θ))M 0 (θ).
As in the analysis for optimal damage, let
L(θ) =

φ(V (θ))
V 0 (θ) M 0 (θ)
× [M (θ) − V (θ)] × cv + cv .
Φ(V (θ))
h( θ ) h( θ )

Clearly, L(θ) and Π0 (θ) always have the same sign. In the above equation, the second term
M 0 (θ)
=
h( cθv )

cv
cv cv
(p
−
q)
+
q
( + W − S] − x − q(cv + ci )
θ2
θ
θ

cv 
1 − H( θ )]
cv
+q
W − S + E(v | v > )
h( cθv )
θ






is decreasing in θ. So if M 0 (1) > 0, that is,
M 0 (1) = h(cv )cv {p(cv + W − S) − x − q(cv + ci )}
+q[1 − H(cv )] [W − S + E(v | v > cv )] .
> 0
M 0 (θ) is always positive on [0, 1]. Otherwise there exists 0 < θst < 1 such that M 0 (θ) is
strictly positive for θ < θst and negative otherwise.
φ(V (θ))
V 0 (θ)
For the first term, Φ(V
(θ)) and h( cθv ) are always positive and M (θ) − V (θ) is decreasing
in θ. So if M (1) − V (1) > 0, that is,
M (1) − V (1) = H(cv ) [pS + (1 − p)W ]
+[1 − H(cv )] {W − x − qci }
> 0,
then M 0 (θ) is always positive on [0, 1]. Otherwise there exists 0 < θex < 1 such that M (θ) −
V (θ) is strictly positive for θ < θex and negative otherwise.
So if M 0 (1) > 0 and M (1) − V (1) > 0 , then full injunction is always optimal.
If M 0 (1) < 0 and M (1) − V (1) < 0, then full injunction is never optimal. The optimal
injunction level lies in between θst and θex .
If M 0 (1) > 0 M (1) − V (1) < 0 , the optimal injunction level is in (θex , 1].
If M 0 (1) < 0 and M (1) − V (1) > 0 , the optimal injunction level lies in (θst , 1].
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